The Effect of Direct Democratic Participation on Citizens’ Political Attitudes in Switzerland: The Difference between Availability and Use by Kern, Anna
1 
 
Anna Kern 
The Effect of Direct Democratic Participation on Citizens’ 
Political Attitudes in Switzerland: 
The Difference between Availability and Use 
 
Politics and Governance, forthcoming 
© Politics and Governance 
 
Abstract 
According to advocates of direct democracy, it is important to involve citizens more directly 
into the political decision making process in order to create a democratic linkage between 
citizens and the political system. Indeed, some studies show that citizens who live in direct 
democracies have higher levels of trust in political institutions and political efficacy. However, 
not all empirical evidence confirms this relationship. In a recent article on Switzerland it has 
been shown that while the availability of direct democratic rights enhances trust in political 
institutions, using those rights actually initiates distrust. In this paper I expand the analysis of 
Bauer and Fatke (2014) and test whether the different effects of the availability of direct 
democratic rights and the frequency of their use also hold for broader measures of trust in 
political institutions and political efficacy. I find that while an increased use of direct 
democratic measures is associated with lower levels of confidence in authorities on the cantonal 
level, this relationship disappears for a more comprehensive measurement of trust in political 
institutions.  
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Introduction 
A legitimate, stable and well-functioning polity is based on a strong relation between citizens 
and the state. However, in most established democracies the mechanisms that connect citizens 
with the political system have fundamentally changed in the last few decades (Dalton & Welzel, 
2014). Given this development, proponents of direct democracy argue that one way of 
sustaining and strengthening the linkage between citizens and the state is to involve citizens 
more directly into the political decision making process. The theory of participatory democracy 
provides a theoretical foundation for this argument. Political philosophers adhering to this 
theory assume that participation has an educative and an integrative function that connects 
citizens with the community (Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970). In recent years, the attitudinal 
effect of direct democratic participation has attracted renewed interest in the literature. Most of 
this research has been conducted in countries that provide citizens with extensive mechanisms 
to engage directly in decision-making, notably the United States and Switzerland. Yet, the 
findings of those studies seem rather inconclusive and – even more striking – the results of 
some analyses are in sharp contrast with what participatory democrats would predict. 
In one of these studies on the relationship between direct democracy and trust in cantonal 
authorities in Switzerland Bauer and Fatke (2014) found that while levels of trust are higher in 
cantons that offer extensive direct democratic rights, they are lower in cantons in which those 
rights are in fact frequently used by citizens. Hence, making more frequently use of direct 
democratic rights is found to strengthen distrust. Dyck (2009) obtained similar results in the 
American context, as he shows that ballot initiatives in the United States decrease trust in state 
governments. These studies suggest that while the availability of direct democratic procedures 
might have the effect that is envisioned in the literature, the fact that citizens actually use those 
opportunities might be an indication of distrust rather than trust. Hence they come to the 
conclusion that the use of direct democratic procedures might initiate political distrust.  
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Yet, looking closely at the indicators that were used to measure political trust in those two 
studies, shows that Bauer and Fatke (2014) as well as Dyck (2009) relied on a rather narrow 
measurement that only captures trust in authorities on the canton or the state level. While this 
negative relationship between such specific measures of trust and the use of direct democratic 
procedures is indeed conceivable, it remains to be investigated whether we also find the same 
effect if we use a more encompassing measurement of trust in political institutions. Using a 
broader operationalization of trust in political institutions seems important because it can 
represent “a comprehensive assessment of the political culture that is prevailing in a political 
system” (Hooghe, 2011, p. 270). In line with David Easton (1965; 1975), I consider trust in 
political institutions as an expression of support for the political system, which is not just the 
result of satisfaction with performance (Chanley et al. 2000; Marien & Hooghe 2011; Miller & 
Listhaug 1990) and hence represents a form of legitimacy (Hetherington, 1998; Zmerli & 
Hooghe, 2011). Consequently, from a normative point of view, a negative effect of direct 
democracy on trust in political institutions would be worrisome as it would endanger the 
functioning and the stability of the democratic system. I therefore rely on trust in political 
institutions more broadly defined and expand the analysis even further by including a second 
measure that is also directly related to the classical conceptualization of a democratic civic 
culture: external political efficacy, i.e. the belief that governmental institutions and public 
officials are responsive to the interests, need and demands of citizens. Political efficacy is of 
course a very distinct concept from political trust, but the entire research tradition on the civic 
culture stresses that it is important that citizens also see themselves as active participants in the 
political process. Both concepts therefore represent important political attitudes linking citizens 
and the state. Already in Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) both attitudes were 
considered to be an essential element of a democratic civic culture. 
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To investigate the relationship between having and using direct democratic rights and support 
for the political system I rely on the models of Bauer and Fatke (2014) and extend their analysis. 
I do so by including other, and more comprehensive attitudinal measurements than in their 
original study, namely trust in political institutions and furthermore also external political 
efficacy. Both measures are assumed to be developed during childhood, they are expected to be 
relatively independent of outputs in the short run and hence comparatively stable over time 
(Easton, 1975; Iyengar 1980). To measure trust in political institutions and external political 
efficacy I draw on two different datasets from Switzerland: the Swiss Electoral Studies 
“Selects” and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The Selects survey 2007 is a post-election 
survey that is based on a national representative sample and the SHP is a rich, representative, 
household based study which aims to observe social change in Switzerland since 1999. I start 
with a replication of the results of Bauer and Fatke (2014) and therefore datasets from 2007 are 
used. As is well-known Switzerland has a unique history of a rather frequent usage of direct 
democracy, and hence the country can serve as an ideal test case.  
 
Political participation and “thick” democracy 
In her seminal work Participation and Democratic Theory Pateman (1970) describes 
participatory democracy that stresses the educative value of political participation and contrasts 
it with liberal democracy that highlights mainly the instrumental value of political participation 
for participants. Pateman summarizes three functions of political participation. First, political 
participation has an educative function, second, it has an integrative function and third, it 
facilitates the acceptance of decisions. For participatory democrats the first and most important 
function is the educative function of political participation. Citizens who participate in political 
decision making are assumed to learn to take other interests than their own into account when 
engaging in participatory processes, they are expected to learn that public and private interests 
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are linked and they are stimulated to deliberate with each other. It is through participation that 
individuals are expected to acquire the qualities that are needed for the political system to work 
and hence it is through “participation in common seeing and common work”, that the members 
of a “strong” democratic community are transformed into citizens (Barber 1984, p. 232). While 
Rousseau described the educative effects of political participation in the context of the city-
state, John Stuart Mill described them in the scope of a modern political system and he extends 
Rousseau’s description of the educative function of participation. As Pateman (1970) points 
out, for Mill, the local level of government plays a crucial role in “educating” the individual. In 
order to participate effectively in government, citizens need to develop the necessary qualities 
at the local level. Mill writes “a political act, to be done only once in a few years, and for which 
nothing in the daily habits of the citizen has prepared him, leaves his intellect and his moral 
dispositions very much as it found them” (cited in Pateman 1970, p. 30). Following this theory, 
citizens thus need a context in which they can practice their engagement in the decision making 
process. While the local level of politics appears a suitable context for Mill, Cole and Pateman 
stress the importance of participatory structures in the workplace or in fact, in all “lower level 
authority structures” (Pateman 1970, p. 35) as environments in which citizens can experience 
and practice to influence decision-making. According to this theory, we can expect, that 
individuals who are frequently engaged in the decision-making process, develop more positive, 
democratic characteristics, such as community-mindedness, political efficacy and satisfaction 
with political institutions and authorities, and are generally more supportive of the democratic 
system (Barber, 1984; Finkel, 1987; Pateman, 1970). However, what remains unclear is 
whether this theory can help us to understand potential consequences of direct democratic 
decision making. Can participation in direct democratic procedures fulfil the same role that 
participation at the local level or in the workplace is expected to? 
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Bowler and Donovan (2002) discuss this question explicitly. They argue that while direct 
democratic procedures may not have the same educative value as participation in the workplace, 
in comparison to the election of representatives, direct democratic procedures should have a 
greater effect on political efficacy. This reasoning is built on the argument that in contrast to 
the standard electoral context of representative democracy, citizens in democracies with direct 
democratic procedures must decide more often on collective issues and public policies. Through 
direct democratic decision making citizens get an “occasional voice in government” and the 
feeling that government is listening to them “or has to listen to them at some point” (Bowler 
and Donovan 2002, p. 376). But citizens might not only feel that government listens to them, 
they might also feel that they are being trusted, which is a crucial point according to Frey (1997, 
p. 1046), as their self-esteem is enhanced and their intrinsic motivation is “crowded in”. Finally, 
compared to citizens in representative democracies, citizens in systems with direct democratic 
procedures might be characterized by more positive political attitudes and democratic 
orientations, because they are more satisfied with the democratic procedures (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 2001; Persson, Esaiasson, and Gilljam 2013; Smith and Tolbert 2004). Following 
these arguments, it can be assumed that the central claim of participatory democracy applies to 
systems with extensive direct democratic procedures and accordingly that citizens who live in 
those systems are characterized by  more positive attitudes towards the political system.  
Indeed, some studies find evidence for the “educative benefit” of direct democratic decision 
making. These analyses suggest that citizens who live in direct democracies are characterized 
by higher levels of external efficacy, i.e. they believe more strongly that the government is 
responsive to their demands (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Hero and Tolbert 2004; Mendelsohn 
and Cutler 2000; Smith and Tolbert 2004), have higher levels of political knowledge and 
interest (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; Smith 2002) and are more engaged in civic groups and 
associations (Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). 
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However, not all empirical evidence confirms this direct positive relationship between direct 
democratic procedures and political attitudes and behavior. Gilens, Glaser, and Mendelberg 
(2001) cannot find a direct effect of propositions on political attitudes, however they show that 
it is the salience of propositions that seems to affect citizens’ perception that they comprehend 
and have a say in political issues. The absence of a direct effect between direct democratic 
procedures and both internal and external efficacy is also ascertained by Schlozman and Yohai 
(2008) and by Dyck and Lascher (2009) who show that the effect of direct democracy on 
internal political efficacy depends on citizens’ political knowledge.  
A salient contrast between the studies that find a positive effect of direct democracy on political 
attitudes and those that find no effect is that scholars who find no effect distinguished between 
the institutional availability of direct democratic rights and the frequency of their actual use. 
This important distinction is not always clearly made in the literature and might explain the 
mixed evidence. It thus remains an open question whether citizens need to actually use direct 
democratic procedures to being more trusting and efficacious or whether the mere availability 
of these opportunities is sufficient in order to strengthen their trust in the political system, 
independent of whether they actually use these additional possibilities to voice their opinion.  
 
The availability and use of direct democratic procedures 
Several studies show that the effect of the availability of direct democratic procedures on 
political attitudes is different from the effect of actually using those procedures. Dyck (2009) 
finds that while the availability of initiatives in the United States does not affect trust in the 
state government, their usage affects trust negatively. This negative effect is confirmed in the 
study of trust in cantonal authorities in Switzerland (Bauer & Fatke, 2014). However, with 
respect to the availability of direct democratic rights, Bauer and Fatke (2014) find a positive 
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effect. Hence, the question arises whether we should expect different effects of availability and 
use of direct democratic procedures on political attitudes.  
From the perspective of the theory of participatory democracy the results of Bauer and Fatke 
(2014) and Dyck (2009) are highly relevant as they seem to run counter to expectations. For 
adherents of this theory using direct democratic procedures should lead to positive effects, as it 
is the act of participation itself that is expected to build and nurture democratic orientations and 
political attitudes. In order to obtain this psychological effect, the classical writers advocated 
full participation. However, Pateman (1970, p. 73) remarks, that in this context a modification 
of the theory is required, because empirical evidence shows that “[…] even the mere feeling 
that participation is possible, even situations of pseudo-participation have beneficial effects on 
confidence, job satisfaction, etc.”. One might thus argue that citizens might be more supportive 
if they have the feeling that they could participate, independent of whether they actually do so. 
The argument that government is responsive and considers them as trustworthy should be valid 
for citizens independent of their actual engagement. Moreover, citizens might be more satisfied 
with the decision-making process in a system with direct democratic procedures, no matter 
whether they participate themselves or not. In conclusion, the theory of participatory democracy 
does not seem to provide a theoretical foundation for the expectation of different effects of 
availability and usage of direct democratic procedures on political attitudes. The first hypothesis 
reads thus as follows:  
H1. Citizens who live in systems that provide extensive direct democratic decision-making 
processes are characterized by higher levels of trust in political institutions and higher external 
political efficacy. 
Consequently, it remains questionable how we can then explain the negative relation between 
using direct democratic rights and trust in canton and state level authorities that Bauer and Fatke 
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(2014) and Dyck (2009) found in their studies. Bauer and Fatke (2014) and Dyck (2009) give 
a number of reasons why this negative relationship was to be expected. If we start from the 
premise of liberal democracy instead of participatory democracy and assume that participation 
mainly serves to protect citizens’ individual interests, direct democracy can be used as a 
sanctioning instrument. In line with this assumption citizens in states or cantons in which this 
instrument is frequently employed might get the impression that sanctioning is a necessity and 
that elected representatives are not to be trusted (Bauer & Fatke, 2014). This would be in line 
with the argument made by Rosanvallon (2008) that critical citizens should exert a rather strict 
oversight on the behaviour of political decision-making elites. Dyck (2009) argues that being 
constantly questioned and circumvented, initiatives might undermine the authority of elected 
officials, which might again lead to increasing distrust among the population. At the same time, 
Bauer and Fatke (2014, p. 54) point out that representatives who are constantly controlled 
“might no longer feel the same obligation to honour the trust of being voted into office”, which 
might encourage them to “follow their own agenda” or to tweak contested legislation in the 
phase of implementation where citizens have less influence. Such behaviour might by 
implication enhance citizens’ distrust and diminish their sense of political efficacy. While this 
reasoning suggests that direct democratic participation affects citizen’s attitudes towards the 
political system, the argument that direct democratic processes are used as sanctioning 
mechanism rests on the reverse causal mechanism, as it implies that those citizens participate 
that are already dissatisfied with the performance of political institutions. Using an instrumental 
variable regression, Bauer and Fatke (2014) find evidence for the former causal mechanism. 
MacKenzie and Warren (2012) however, argue that participation might stem from a lack of 
trust. Following this reasoning, citizens might choose to use their direct democratic rights after 
evaluating how trustworthy their cantonal or state authorities are and how responsive they are 
to citizens’ interest. This reasoning would be in line with Gamson (1968, p. 46-47) who stated 
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that “high trust in authorities implies some lack of necessity for influencing them”. Hence, one 
would expect that citizens will only use direct democracy if there is a necessity to influence 
policy-makers. 
While both mechanisms seem plausible for the explanation of a negative relationship between 
trust in cantonal or state authorities – the dependent variables in the studies of Bauer and Fatke 
(2014) and Dyck (2009) – and engagement in direct democratic decision-making procedures, it 
remains unclear whether these explanations can also be applied to a broader notion of trust in 
political institutions and to external political efficacy. The argument that frequent usage of 
direct democratic procedures reduces political trust, as those procedures are used as sanctioning 
mechanisms seems to hold mainly in cases in which citizens are dissatisfied with the output and 
the performance of political authorities and institutions. The reasoning thus seems to hold 
mainly for trust in specific institutions and authorities and is therefore expected to depend 
mainly on the perceived output and performance of those institutions. In fact, the dependent 
variables in the above mentioned studies are, as Dyck (2009, p. 550) points out himself, “ […] 
strongly tied to incumbent evaluations.” 
However, regarding the broader measure of trust in political institutions, the reasoning seems 
less straightforward. Trust in political institutions is an assessment of general political structures 
and procedures, and it tends to be more durable and independent of institutions’ performances 
and output in the short run. Only after a continuous experience of discontent over a long period 
of time general feelings of trust in political institutions might gradually erode (Easton, 1975; 
Hooghe, 2011). Therefore, I argue that while there are good reasons to assume that using direct 
democratic procedures is related to evaluations of democratic output and performance of 
specific political institutions it is far less clear why using direct democratic procedures should 
lead to an erosion of trust in political institutions more generally. 
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Also regarding external political efficacy, a negative relationship with using direct democratic 
rights can hardly be expected based on the theory. In fact, Hero and Tolbert (2004) argue that 
in citizens in states with frequent exposure to direct democracy should be more inclined to 
perceive government as more responsive. A negative effect on external efficacy would rather 
be expected to be the result of non-participation (Finkel 1987). I therefore argue that the 
negative effect of using direct democratic procedures that has been found in the study of trust 
in cantonal and state authorities does not hold in a study of trust in political institutions and 
external political efficacy, leading to the second hypothesis: 
H2. The negative effect of using direct democratic procedures does not hold if we study trust in 
political institutions and external political efficacy. 
I test those hypotheses using Swiss population data, but before the results are presented I will 
introduce the datasets, measures and method. 
 
Data, Measures and Method 
First of all the results of Bauer and Fatke (2014) are replicated. In a second step their models 
are extended to the study of trust in political institutions and political efficacy. I will therefore 
use the same data as they did which is the 2007 dataset from the Swiss Electoral Studies 
“Selects” that contains not only trust in cantonal authorities but also other items that allow us 
to create a comprehensive measure of trust in political institutions. As the Selects dataset does 
not contain any measure of political efficacy I use a different dataset for the analysis of political 
efficacy, namely the 2007 wave of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). Both datasets are based 
on random probability samples from the Swiss population and for both data were collected in a 
similar period of time. This allows to include the same variables of interest, i.e. the availability 
and use of direct democratic instruments and thus to keep the analysis as comparable as possible 
to the original analysis of Bauer and Fatke (2014). However, as the SHP only contains one 
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question on the perception of system responsiveness, the analysis has to be restricted to external 
political efficacy.  
Dependent variables 
In comparison to the study of Bauer and Fatke (2014) I expand the analysis to support for the 
system as a whole and therefore I want to capture the level of trust in political institutions more 
broadly. As Easton explains (1975, p. 444) diffuse support “refers to evaluations of what an 
object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does”. 
Therefore, if we start from Easton’s concept of diffuse support, we need indicators for support 
that are independent of outputs and performances in the short run. Marien (2011) argues that 
the question that asks people how much they trust their country’s parliament, government, 
political parties, legal system, the police, etc. does tap into a more encompassing form of 
political trust – although we cannot rule out that respondents think about how these institutions 
are functioning. According to Hooghe (2011, p. 270) the latent concept that is built on these 
items “can be conceptualized as a comprehensive evaluation of the political culture that is 
prevailing within a political system […]”. Hence, instead of focusing on for example 
satisfaction with the functioning of an institution or authority, I have decided to measure trust 
in political institutions, based on the following items, that are included in the Selects 2007 
survey: Trust in the federal council, trust in parliament, trust in national political parties, trust 
in local authorities, trust in justice/courts, trust in the police and the item that was use in the 
first step of the analysis trust in cantonal authorities. Under the assumption that this latent 
concept of trust in political institutions reflects the trustworthiness of the political system as a 
whole, it is expected that the different items on trust in actors and institutions load on one single 
latent variable. For each item respondents indicated their level of trust on an 11-point scale (0= 
“no trust”; 10= “full trust”). Based on these items I conducted a factor analysis and found, in 
line with previous research, that these items load one single factor (Marien, 2011; Zmerli, 
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Newton, & Montero, 2007) with an Eigenvalue of 3.214 and 46 per cent explained variance 
(Table 1). This measurement of trust in political institutions thus is one-dimensional and 
coherent. This finding hence confirms the argumentation of Hooghe (2001) that citizens do not 
distinguish between the functioning of various political institutions. Therefore, this factor was 
used as measurement of trust in political institutions. 
Table 1: Factor Analysis of Trust in Political Institutions 
Item Factor loading 
Trust in the federal council 0.720 
Trust in parliament 0.744 
Trust in national political parties 0.644 
Trust in local authorities 0.624 
Trust in cantonal authorities 0.749 
Trust in justice/courts 0.646 
Trust in the police  0.600 
% explained variance 0.459 
Eigenvalue 3.214 
Note: Estimates are factor loadings from a principal factor analysis. Source: Selects 2007. 
 
For the measurement of external political efficacy I relied on the question “How much influence 
do you think someone like you can have on government policy?” in the SHP 2007 personal 
questionnaire. Respondents could answer on an 11-point scale with 0 indicating “no influence” 
and 10 indicating “a very strong influence”. Following Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) this 
item primarily taps respondents’ beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities 
and institutions to citizen demands, i.e. their sense of external political efficacy.  
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Independent variables 
As I aim to build on the analysis of Bauer and Fatke (2014) I use the same measures as they did 
for the independent variables of interest, namely the availability of direct democratic rights and 
the usage of those rights. For the availability of those rights I thus rely on the same index that 
was created by Fischer (2009). This index represents a summary index of four sub-indices 
which capture the strength of four direct democratic institutions in 2003: the initiatives for 
constitutional and statutory changes, the fiscal referendum on expenditure projects and the 
referendum for laws. Each sub-index ranges from one to six and reflects the evaluation of 
requirements for those four institutions more specifically the signature requirements that are 
needed for optional referendums and the fiscal thresholds for fiscal referendums. Therefore 
each sub-index measures the availability and the imposed hurdles for each of the four direct 
democratic procedures in the Swiss cantons. 
Regarding the actual usage of these direct democratic instruments, I use the average number of 
cantonal initiatives and optional referendums per year between 2002 and 2006 that has been 
generated by Bauer and Fatke (2014) based on data from the year book “Année politique Suisse” 
that is generally considered to offer a comprehensive account of political events in Switzerland. 
Control variables 
I furthermore control for variables that could affect trust in political institutions and political 
efficacy on the individual as well as on the cantonal level. Again, since I am interested in an 
analysis that is as close as possible to the one presented by Bauer and Fatke (2014), I also 
include exactly the same control variables. For the analysis of trust in political institutions this 
is gender, age, the level of education and the perception of the economic development. Also I 
include a dummy variable for Catholic denomination and unemployment status. Thanks to their 
detailed documentation of data sources, I could also include the same canton-level control 
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variables, namely the financial state of cantons in 2006 and the primary national income per 
capita in 2005. 
For the analysis of external political efficacy I include the same control variables, expect for 
religious denomination and the perception of economic development. I excluded religious 
denomination, because in the literature I found no reason to assume that religious denomination 
should affect the sense of external efficacy. Economic evaluations, on the other hand, are 
expected to affect general political attitudes (Bowler & Donovan, 2002), however, the item that 
was used in the Selects survey is not included in the SHP. Instead, I included a variable that 
measures the respondent’s evaluation of his or her standard of living in the past year. 
Respondents could answer on a scale from 0 (“greatly worsened”) to 10 (“greatly improved”).  
In both, the analysis of trust in political institutions and the analysis of external political efficacy 
I dropped the canton Nidwalden, because the Selects survey 2007 does not contain data for this 
canton. I therefore have 3,858 respondents for the analysis of trust in political institutions and 
4,094 respondents for the analysis of external political efficacy. In both analyses those 
respondents are nested in cantons, which is why I rely on varying intercept models.  
 
Results 
In the first step, I replicate the analysis of trust in cantonal authorities of Bauer and Fatke (2014) 
(their Table 2). Unsurprisingly, using the same data I find virtually the same results (see 
Appendix, Table A). As the final model, which contains all the control variables and both 
variables of interest shows, the availability of direct democratic rights affects trust in cantonal 
authorities positively while their actual use has a significant, negative effect. So this first step 
just confirms the conclusion of Bauer and Fatke. 
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In the second step, I replicate the exact same analysis but this time I replace the dependent 
variable with the variable that captures trust in political institutions (Table 2). The first 
remarkable observation is that there is considerably less variance in trust in political institutions 
on the second level compared to the variance in trust in cantonal authorities. Our replication of 
the intercept-only model of trust in cantonal authorities revealed that about 6 per cent of the 
entire variance is found on the second level. For the intercept-only model of trust in political 
institutions, this is only 2.3 per cent. This confirms the assumption that trust in cantonal 
authorities captures evaluations of the performance of specific institutions apparently which 
vary quite substantially across the 25 cantons. The broader attitude of trust in political 
institutions, on the other hand, captures an attitude that varies primarily between individuals 
independent of where they live. Hence, when attempting to explain the variance in trust in 
political institutions, we have to focus mainly on individual characteristics which is why this 
observation already challenges the first hypothesis claiming that those citizens are characterized 
by higher levels of trust in political institutions and external efficacy that live in cantons which 
provide more extensive direct democratic decision-making processes. The effects of those 
individual-level variables, however, are similar compared to the effects in the analysis of trust 
in cantonal authorities. While sex does not seem to matter, trust in political institutions seems 
to rise with age and the level of education. Ceteris paribus, Catholics seem to have higher levels 
of trust in political institutions and unemployment comes along with lower levels of trust in 
political institutions. Also, citizens who believe that the state of the economy has worsened are 
significantly less trustful. Looking at the second-level control variables it shows that a canton’s 
financial state and national income do not affect individuals’ level of trust in political 
institutions.  
Finally, I turn to our variables of interest. The first model reveals that the availability of direct 
democratic rights does affect levels of trust in political institutions positively, which seems in 
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line with what the theory of participatory democracy would predict. However, if we turn to the 
second model, we find that, just as in the analysis of trust in cantonal authorities, the use of 
direct democratic instruments has a significant, negative effect on trust in political institutions, 
which is in sharp contrast to what we had expected.  
 
Table 2: Random-intercept models of direct democracy and trust in political institutions  
 Trust in political institutions 
 I II III 
Age 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 
Sex 0.036 (0.030) 0.036 (0.030) 0.036 (0.030) 
Education 0.022*** (0.004) 0.023*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.004) 
Catholic (Dummy) 0.122*** (0.032) 0.123*** (0.032) 0.121*** (0.032) 
Economy worse (Dummy) -0.281*** (0.052) -0.284*** (0.052) -
0.281*** 
(0.052) 
Unemployed (Dummy) -0.233* (0.126) -0.235* (0.126) -0.233* (0.126) 
Availability of direct  0.051** (0.026)   0.036 (0.031) 
democratic rights       
Actual use of direct    -0.047* (0.025) -0.027 (0.031) 
democratic instruments       
Financial state -0.001 (0.026) -0.000 (0.026) -0.002 (0.026) 
National income 0.144 (0.516) 0.818 (0.555) 0.463 (0.627) 
       
Constant -0.568** (0.228) -0.595** (0.232) -
0.604*** 
(0.228) 
       
Observations 3,858 3,858 3,858 
Number of groups 25 25 25 
-2 * loglikelihood 10,165 10,166 10,164 
ICC in % 0.016 0.016 0.015 
Note: The dependent variable is trust in political institutions. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.:*** p<0.01, 
** p <0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Selects 2007. 
 
Yet, both effects disappear when we include them together in one model (Model III) and at this 
point, the conclusions differ strongly from the conclusions resulting from the analysis of trust 
in cantonal authorities. Neither the availability nor the use of direct democratic procedures 
seems to affect trust in political institutions. On the one hand, this result contradicts the first 
hypothesis. On the other hand, the negative effect of using direct democratic instruments 
disappears and this supports the second hypothesis. So, while using direct democratic measures 
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apparently cannot enhance trust in political institutions, the good news for advocates of 
participatory democracy is at least that it does not seem to deteriorate it either. 
In a final step we turn to the analysis of external political efficacy (Table 3.). This variable 
varies even less across cantons than trust in political institutions. Only about 2 per cent of the 
variance in the intercept-only model is detected at the second level. Concerning the individual 
level variables, we find different effects than for trust in political institutions. While older 
people seem to have more trust in political institutions than younger citizens, a sense of external 
political efficacy seems to diminish with age. Citizens with a higher level of education appear 
to have not only more trust in political institutions but also more external political efficacy and 
also citizens who feel that their standard of living has improved have a stronger sense of external 
political efficacy. 
 
Table 3: Random-intercept models of direct democracy and external political efficacy  
 External Political Efficacy 
 I II III 
Age -0.015*** (0.003) -0.015*** (0.003) -
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
Sex -0.053 (0.086) -0.052 (0.086) -0.053 (0.086) 
Education 0.095*** (0.015) 0.094*** (0.015) 0.095*** (0.015) 
Living standard improved 0.158*** (0.035) 0.158*** (0.035) 0.157*** (0.035) 
Unemployed (Dummy) 0.434 (0.370) 0.437 (0.370) 0.436 (0.370) 
Availability of direct  0.192*** (0.054)   0.181*** (0.061) 
democratic rights       
Actual use of direct    -0.113 (0.070) -0.025 (0.068) 
democratic instruments       
Financial state 0.079 (0.065) 0.085 (0.076) 0.074 (0.065) 
National income 0.974 (1.187) 3.323** (1.506) 1.358 (1.523) 
       
Constant 1.724*** (0.592) 1.572** (0.690) 1.666*** (0.606) 
       
Observations 4,094  4,094 
Number of groups 25  25 
-2 * loglikelihood 19,331  19,339 
ICC in % 0.004  0.009 
Note: The dependent variable is external political efficacy. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.:*** p<0.01, ** 
p <0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP). 
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Tuning to the variables of interest we find that the availability of direct democratic rights has a 
positive effect on external efficacy (Model I) and this effect also holds when we include the use 
of direct democratic instruments into the same model (Model III). Using direct democratic 
instruments, however does not affect external efficacy, neither in the second nor in the final 
model (Model III). Apparently, citizens have a stronger feeling that government is responsive 
to their demands and interests in cantons in which direct democratic instruments are extensively 
available and hurdles to use them are low. And this effect remains observable independent of 
how often those instruments are actually used.  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Summarizing the results, we can state that there is only limited evidence for the first hypothesis 
which claimed that the availability and the use of direct democratic procedures has a positive 
effect on political attitudes that tap support for the political system. While we could not find 
any effect for the analysis of trust in political institutions, levels of external efficacy are 
significantly higher in cantons which are characterized by an extensive availability of direct 
democratic procedures. However, it has to be remarked that there is generally a lot less variance 
of both, trust in political institutions as well as external political efficacy across the 25 cantons 
compared to the variance that is found for trust in cantonal authorities. So while evaluations of 
cantonal authorities depend to a substantial degree on the canton in which respondents live, 
levels of general trust in political institutions and feelings of external efficacy are hardly 
dependent on the administrative division in which one lives. I interpret this finding as evidence 
for the claim that trust in authorities captures evaluations of performances of specific 
institutions rather than trust in political institutions as such. 
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Concerning the second hypothesis, we did find evidence to support the claim that while there 
are good reasons to argue that using direct democratic instruments affects trust in cantonal 
authorities negatively, such a negative effect is unexpected in the study of trust in political 
institutions more generally. In fact, using direct democratic instruments seems to affect neither 
trust in political institutions nor external political efficacy. If direct democratic instruments are 
used as sanctioning mechanism for negatively perceived performances and outputs of 
authorities this can explain the negative effect on evaluations of cantonal authorities and 
institutions, however, there is little reason to assume that broader attitudes of support for the 
system are also affected. 
I believe that this study can contribute to a better understanding of the mixed evidence that was 
found in previous studies concerning the link between direct democratic procedures and 
political attitudes. In this regard, two aspects should be considered. First, in some studies a 
difference is made between availability of direct democratic rights and the use of direct 
democratic instruments and because results differ quite substantively this study confirms the 
importance of this distinction. Second, different measures of trust in political institutions have 
been employed in those studies and different theories have been applied to explain the results. 
This study underlines the importance to clearly distinguish between the different measures. 
Participatory democracy can primarily serve to understand the long-term effects of extensive 
participation in different areas of life on support for the political system. Liberal democracy, on 
the other hand, that stresses the protective function of participation might help to explain 
evaluations of political outputs and performances of specific authorities and institutions.  
But what do these results tell us about the applicability of the theory of participatory democracy 
to direct democratic procedures? While the findings of Bauer and Fatke (2014) and Dyck (2009) 
seem inexplicable from the perspective of participatory democracy, as they suggest that using 
more opportunities for direct participation “initiates distrust”, our analysis can qualify these 
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findings to some degree. While an increase in using direct democratic measures might diminish 
trust in authorities on the state or canton level, it does not affect the general feeling of support 
for the political system. So in the end it is not too bad of a result for adherents of this theory. 
However these results can be interpreted in two ways.  
On the one hand, they show that providing citizens with more direct democratic instruments 
appears to affect their trust in cantonal authorities positively as well as their sense of external 
efficacy - and this independent of how much those instruments are used. Apparently, having 
the option of interfering is already sufficient to strengthen citizens’ trust in cantonal authorities 
and their sense of government responsiveness. A potential reason would be that citizens are 
satisfied with the democratic process itself, independent of whether they use it. This 
interpretation would be in line with the claim of Dalton and Welzel (2014) that new generations 
of “assertive citizens” are characterized by a strong appreciation of input-oriented notions of 
democracy. Hence, if direct participation can lead to more critical citizens, that are however 
supportive of the system as such, some scholars might argue that from a democratic perspective, 
this represents a desirable situation (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Rosanvallon, 2008). 
On the other hand, support for the first hypothesis that links direct democratic participation with 
political support remains limited, which might call the general applicability of the theory of 
participatory democracy for direct democratic systems into question. As we have seen for both, 
trust in political institutions as well as political efficacy, by far, most of the variance is found 
on the individual level and can therefore not be explained by the variance in the extent of direct 
democratic decision making. One reason could be that in comparison to other countries, Swiss 
cantons all provide relatively extensive opportunities of participation in decision-making 
processes and that the variance within Switzerland is therefore too limited. Another, even more 
fundamental reason could be that participatory democrats seem to envision an entirely different 
society with multiple participation possibilities in the workplace, during free time activities and 
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at all levels of the political system. Moreover, as Schlozman and Yohai (2008, p. 472) point out 
these theorists stress the importance of deliberation and the benefits of deliberation cannot arise 
in plebiscites “where voters do not deliberate or where their interest clash”. So scholars should 
be careful when applying the theory of participatory democracy to direct democratic systems 
and not blindly base their assumptions on a theory that envisions an entire reconfiguration of 
todays’ political, economic and societal institutions. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Random-intercept models of direct democracy and external trust in cantonal 
authorities 
 Trust in cantonal authorities 
 I II III IV V VI 
Age 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Sex 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.054 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Education 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Catholic (Dummy) 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.188*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Economy worse (Dummy) -
0.456*** 
-
0.445*** 
-
0.457*** 
-
0.444*** 
-
0.452*** 
-
0.445*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
Unemployed (Dummy) -0.350 -0.344 -0.349 -0.344 -0.350 -0.345 
 (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) 
Availability of direct   0.282***  0.275***  0.198** 
democratic rights  (0.067)  (0.070)  (0.080) 
Actual use of direct    -0.151**  -
0.243*** 
-0.134* 
democratic instruments   (0.075)  (0.073) (0.079) 
Financial state    0.015 0.021 0.012 
    (0.072) (0.076) (0.068) 
National income    0.356 3.914** 1.966 
    (1.383) (1.567) (1.618) 
Constant 6.013*** 4.846*** 6.221*** 4.644*** 4.519*** 4.451*** 
 (0.187) (0.329) (0.210) (0.605) (0.649) (0.587) 
       
Observations 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 
Number of groups 25 25 25 25 25 25 
-2 * loglikelihood 17,646 17,634 17,642 17,633 17,636 17,630 
ICC in % 0.055 0.030 0.046 0.029 0.033 0.026 
Note: The dependent variable is trust in cantonal authorities. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.:*** p<0.01, 
** p <0.05, * p<0.1 
 
